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POSTBANKRUPTCY REFUSALS TO DEAL WITH THE
DEBTOR AND THE AUTOMATIC STAY: A FRESH
APPROACH
A debtor's primary objective in filing for bankruptcy is to obtain relief.1
The creditor, on the other hand, seeks to recover as much of a debt as
possible when it becomes apparent that the debtor cannot satisfy its
obligation in full.2 Filing a petition in bankruptcy suspends the usual
course of dealing between the debtor and its creditors so that a bankruptcy
court can modify the rights and liabilities between them.3
After filing a petition, the debtor requires instant protection from a
creditor's attempts at collection.4 Accordingly, the Bankruptcy Act of
1978' mandates that creditors stop all collection efforts when the debtor
files a petition in bankruptcy.6 Under section 362(a),7 filing a bankruptcy
petition automatically stays certain actions against the debtor, including
"any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that arose
before the commencement of the case."8
Recently, courts have struggled to determine when a prebankruptcy
creditor's postbankruptcy refusal to deal with the debtor amounts to an "act
to collect" the prebankruptcy debt, thus violating section 362(a)(6).9
Courts have set forth a determinative standard to be used in cases when a
1. 1 DANIEL R. COWANS, BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE § 1, at I (2d ed. 1978).
2. Id. In order to understand completely the law of bankruptcy, one must bear in mind its dual
nature as a remedy for both debtors and creditors. Id.
3. 1 Bankr. Serv., L. Ed. (Law. Co-Op) § 1:1, at 10 (1989). For example:
[C]ollection and foreclosure activities are brought to a halt, executory contracts, including
collective bargaining agreements and unexpired leases, may be assumed or rejected by the
trustee or debtor in possession, and liens become subject to avoidance by the debtor or by the
trustee or debtor in possession as do certain preferences and fraudulent transfers and
obligations.
Id.
4. 1 DAVID G. EPSTEIN ET AL., BANKRUPTCY § 3-1, at 77 (1992). In both voluntary and
involuntary cases, creditors' recovery efforts must cease immediately so that the debtor's property and
financial matters may be managed fairly and uniformly. Id.
5. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988).
6. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1988). See 1 EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 4, § 3-1, at 77. See also infra note
8 and accompanying text.
7. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1988).
8. Id. § 362(a)(6).
9. 1 EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 4, § 3-8, at 119; THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS
OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 157 (1986); Daniel L. Keating, Offensive Uses of the Bankruptcy Stay, 45
VAND. L. REV. 71, 81-82 (1992).
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creditor declines to provide future services unless the debtor repays his
prepetition obligation."t This coercive impact test seeks to distinguish
coercive conduct from noncoercive conduct." Courts find coercive
conduct constitutes an "act to collect," thus violating the automatic stay
under section 362(a)(6). t2  However, it is unclear whether a creditor's
mere refusal to deal with a debtor constitutes coercive behavior. 3
This Note contends that courts have unjustifiably broadened the scope of
section 362(a)(6) by advancing and utilizing the coercive impact standard.
Part I examines the historical development of debtor and creditor relief in
bankruptcy. Part II analyzes the application, scope, objectives, and goals
of the Bankruptcy Code's automatic stay provision. Part III reviews the
judicial interpretation of section 362(a)(6), as it applies to a prebankruptcy
creditor's postbankruptcy conditional refusal to deal with the debtor. Part
IV critiques the judicial interpretations discussed in Part III and concludes
that the judicially-prescribed distinction is problematic. Finally, Part V
argues that courts should read section 362(a)(6) to prohibit only affirmative
acts undertaken by creditors to collect prepetition debts.
I. HISTORY OF DEBTOR AND CREDITOR RELIEF IN BANKRUPTCY
Under early English law, a debtor had few rights in bankruptcy. 4 The
system provided solely for involuntary proceedings, whereby creditors
forced the debtor into bankruptcy. 5 The Englishman who failed to meet
his obligations was routinely imprisoned.' 6
The United States Constitution gives Congress the right to create uniform
laws on bankruptcy. 7 The first American bankruptcy act, adopted in
1800,'8 emulated the early English bankruptcy practices, 9 and provided
10. See infra part III.
11. Morgan Guar. Trust Co. v. American Say. and Loan Ass'n, 804 F.2d 1487, 1491 & n.4 (9th
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 929 (1987); Sechuan City, Inc. v. North Am. Motor Inns, Inc. (In re
Sechuan City, Inc.), 96 B.R. 37, 41 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989).
12. See infra part III.
13. See JACKSON, supra note 9, at 158.
14. Vern Countryman, A History ofAmerican Bankruptcy Law, 81 COM. L.J. 226,226-27 (1976).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 ("The Congress shall have the power to establish uniform laws
on the subject of bankruptcies throughout the United States.").
18. Bankruptcy Act of 1800, ch. 19, 2 Stat. 19 (1800) (repealed 1803).
19. Countryman, supra note 14, at 228; 1 EpsTEiN ET AL., supra note 4, § 1-1, at 1.
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for imprisoning bankrupt debtors.20 The Act of 1800, consistent with
early English practice, permitted only involuntary proceedings against
merchants."
However, the perception of the debtor as a criminal slowly began to
change.22 Eventually, Congress adopted the Bankruptcy Act of 1898,23
which remained in effect for eighty years. The Act of 1898 broadened
debtors' rights further by eliminating the necessity of creditor consent for
discharge in bankruptcy.24
During the 1900s, debtors continued to garner more protection.' The
legal age of the consumer arose after World War 1.26 As the amount of
consumer credit increased significantly, the number of bankruptcies, both
consumer and business related, grew accordingly.2 Recognizing this
intensifying condition, Congress determined that the Act of 1898 failed to
provide adequate relief for consumer debtors.28 Thus, Congress decided
to modernize the bankruptcy laws 29 by enacting the Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1978.30 The adoption of a new Bankruptcy Code represented
substantial change in substantive American bankruptcy law.3" One
significant change was the expansion of consumer-debtor rights.32
II. THE AUTOMATIC STAY
The new Bankruptcy Code (Code) enlarged both the power and scope of
20. Countryman, supra note 14, at 228. At this time in the United States, only a few states had
insolvency laws discharging the debtor from debt or releasing him from prison. Id.
21. Id. See also I EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 4, § 1-1, at 1.
22. Countryman, supra note 14, at 229.
23. Ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (1898) (repealed 1979).
24. Countryman, supra note 14, at 231.
25. Robert E. Ginsberg, Introduction to the Symposium: The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978-A
Primer, 28 DEPAUL L. REv. 923, 923 n.5 (1979).
26. Id.
27. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963,
5966; S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5788.
28. H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 27, at 116-17, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6076-77.
29. H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 27, at 3, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5965; S. REP. No.
989, supra note 27, at 1, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5787.
30. See also I PATRICK A. MURPHY, CREDITORS' RIGHTS IN BANKRUPTCY § 1.05 (2d ed. 1988).
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 was the first full revision of the bankruptcy laws since the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898. Id. Congress created the Commission on Bankruptcy Laws of the United
States in 1970 to study and recommend changes to the Act of 1898. Id. Afterward, Congress and the
Commission labored for seven years toward the completion of the Reform Act. Id.
31. 1 WILLIAM M. COLLIER, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1.01, at 1-1 (Lawrence P. King, ed., 15th
ed. 1991).
32. H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 27, at 117-18, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6077-79.
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the automatic stay.33 Section 362(a)(1) of the Code stays any action or
proceeding against the debtor to recover a prepetition claim.34 Section
362(a)(6) goes further, staying "any act to collect, assess, or recover a
claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the
case. '  The broad scope36 of this provision affords greater protection
to the debtor because it prohibits collection acts independent of a "judicial,
administrative or other action or proceeding against the debtor."3 7 Section
362(a)(6) prevents creditors from collecting a prepetition debt "in any
way. 3
8
Filing a petition with the bankruptcy court activates the automatic
stay.39 The stay applies to all entities, whether the bankruptcy proceeding
is voluntary or involuntary.4" However, the stay does not eradicate a
creditor's claim against the debtor.4 ' Rather, it postpones the enforcement
of creditor claims.42 During this delay, the Code may change, diminish,
or even eliminate a creditor's rights against a debtor.43 When the stay
33. Keating, supra note 9, at 75. See also Frank R. Kennedy, Automatic Stays Under the New
Bankruptcy Law, 12 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 3, 10 (1978). Kennedy describes the automatic stay as a
"logical feature" of the Code in part because "[ilt is necessary to prevent creditors from improving their
positions by resorting to means not under the control of the [bankruptcy] court [in order to achieve]
equitable distribution, satisfaction, [and] ... security." Id. at 61-62.
34. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) (1988).
35. Id. § 362(a)(6). See also Doug Rendleman, The Bankruptcy Discharge: Toward a Fresher
Start, 58 N.C. L. REV. 723, 750-51 (1980). The stay remains in effect until the bankruptcy court
replaces it with the discharge injunction, unless the court removes the stay under sections 362(d), (e),
or (f). The discharge releases the debtor from those debts which the court has discharged. Id.
36. 2 COLLIER, supra note 31, § 362.04, at 362-34. The stay applies to almost every formal or
informal action against the debtor. Id.
37. 11 U.S.C. § 362(1)(1) (1988). See I EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 4, § 3-8, at 115.
38. H.R REP. No. 595, supra note 27, at 342, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6298; S. REp.
No. 989, supra note 27, at 50, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5836.
39. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1988); 2 COLLIER, supra note 31, § 362.01, at 362-8. See also 1 EPSTEIN
ET AL., supra note 4, § 3-1, at 78. When a debtor files a bankruptcy petition, the stay automatically
takes effect without any order or request. Id.
40. 1 EPSTEIN ETr AL., supra note 4, § 3-3, at 78. If creditors are not stayed, the resultant
disfunction of the debtor's estate will frustrate the Code's goal of distributive equality. Kennedy, supra
note 33, at 3. Moreover, the continuation of creditor-initiated actions could hinder the debtor's pursuit
of afresh start. Id.
41. 1 EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 4, § 3-1, at 81. The automatic stay "preserve[s] relative values
and ... prevent[s] strategic jockeying by one creditor (or group of creditors) during the bankruptcy
process." JACKSON, supra note 9, at 157. The stay maintains the creditor's standing within the debtor's
estate. During the period of the stay, no creditor may advance its claim over that of another. 1 EPSTEIN
ET AL., supra note 4, § 3-I, at 81.
42. 1 EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 4, § 3-1, at 81.
43. Id.
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ceases to operate, the creditor may enforce its rights to the extent that
bankruptcy law allows.'
A primary purpose of the stay is to stop creditors from collecting debts
that will further their individual self-interests. Such actions could
detrimentally affect the good of all creditors. Yet the stay also attempts
to protect the debtor.46 The automatic stay provides the debtor with a
breathing spell from those creditors seeking the debtor's assets47 by
preventing creditors from harassing the debtor.4 ' Additionally, the stay
allows the debtor to try to reorganize or to repay debts.49 If the debtor
cannot make repayment, the stay relieves the debtor of the financial
pressures that caused the bankruptcy." This protection supports the
Code's fundamental goal: giving the debtor a fresh start.5 This objective
relieves the honest debtor from obligations, and allows the debtor to start
over free from any indebtedness.5
44. Id. at 81. Secured creditors maintain the rights to their collateral even after the case.
Conversely, unsecured creditors generally possess no rights that outlive bankruptcy. Id. at 81-82.
45. JACKSON, supra note 9, at 12. An important purpose of bankruptcy law is to stop individual
creditors from initiating a "run" on the debtor, known as "grab law." Id. at 8-19; 1 Bankr. Serv., L.
Ed., supra note 3, § 1:2. Bankruptcy law prevents runs by providing collective creditor execution on
the assets of the debtor. Id.
Therefore, the automatic stay actually protects the creditor, as well:
Without it, certain creditors would be able to pursue their own remedies against the debtor's
property. Those who acted first would obtain payment of the claims in preference to and to
the detriment of other creditors. Bankruptcy is designed to provide an orderly liquidation
procedure under which all creditors are treated equally. A race of diligence by creditors for
the debtor's assets prevents that.
H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 27, at 340, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6297.
46. Jeffrey Sapir, Automatic Stai
. 
in HANDLING YOUR FIRST PERSONAL BANKRUPTCY 149, 149
(PLI Com. L. & Prac. Course Handbook Series No. 641, 1992).
47. H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 27, at 340, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6296-97; S.
REP. No. 989, supra note 27, at 54, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5840-41.
48. H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 27, at 340, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6297; S. REP.
No. 989, supra note 27, at 54, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5840.
49. H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 27, at 340, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6297; S. REP.
No. 989, supra note 27 at 54-55, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5840-41.
50. H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 27, at 340, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6297; S. REP.
No. 989, supra note 27, at 55, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5841.
51. JACKSON, supra note 9, at 4.
52. Wetmore v. Markoe, 196 U.S. 68, 77 (1904). The Supreme Court stated: "[Slystems of
bankruptcy are designed to relieve the honest debtor from the weight of indebtedness which has become
oppressive, and to permit him to have a fresh start in business or commercial life, freed from the
obligation and responsibilities which may have resulted from business misfortunes." Id.
See also Rendleman, supra note 35, at 723-24 ("Bankruptey's fresh start should provide the bankrupt
with 'a new opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and
discouragement of preexisting debt."') (quoting Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934)).
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The goal of providing such significant debtor protection, however, begs
an important policy question. Because the Code also aims to provide relief
to the creditor,53 how broad is the automatic stay of section 362(a)(6). 4
In formulating section 362(a), Congress recognized that creditors in some
consumer cases telephone debtors to pressure them into repayment despite
their bankruptcy." Inexperienced debtors, Congress noted, might yield to
such pressure." Therefore, in formulating section 362(a)(6), Congress
intended to prevent sophisticated creditors from avoiding the protective
purpose of the bankruptcy laws.5
At least one commentator has stated that courts have interpreted the stay
more broadly than Congress originally intended. The Code understand-
ably forbids traditional creditor collection activities upon the filing of a
bankruptcy petition.59 Nevertheless, critics argue that any expanded
interpretation of the stay conflicts with the Code's attempt to protect
creditors." Others, however, support the expanded stay's hard line
against self-serving creditors.6  Since its introduction, courts have
grappled with the scope of section 362(a)(6).
III. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION
In the sixteen years since the Code's enactment, relatively few courts
have been asked to determine which actions violate the automatic stay
53. JACKSON, supra note 9, at 10. Jackson states:
The basic problem that bankruptcy law is designed to handle, ... is that the system of
individual creditor remedies may be bad for the creditors as a group when there are not
enough assets to go around. Because creditors have conflicting rights, there is a tendency in
their debt-collection efforts to make a bad situation worse.
Id. at 10. Bankruptcy law's solution is a collective creditor forum. Id. at 12-13.
54. Congress has stated that: "The scope of [362(a)] is broad. All proceedings are stayed,
including arbitration, license revocation, administrative, and judicial proceedings. Proceedings in this
sense encompass civil actions as well, and all proceedings even if they are not before governmental
tribunals." H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 27, at 340, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6297.
55. Id. at 342, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6298.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. 1 EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 4, § 3-I, at 84. The authors state that skillful attorneys have
stretched the stay a great deal. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. These critics would point out that the expansive interpretation of the stay is expensive, as
well as harmful, to legitimate creditors' concerns. Id.
61. 1 EPSTEIN wET AL., supra note 4, § 3-I, at 84. These supporters find perilous both direct and
indirect attempts by creditors to better their situations, and thus favor an expansive interpretation of the
stay. Id.
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under section 362(a)(6). 2 Nevertheless, of the courts confronted with the
issue, most have interpreted the section in a similar fashion.63 These
courts have attempted to differentiate between requests for payment that are
not coercive or harassing and conduct intended to coerce a debtor into
paying a prepetition debt.'
Some courts, however, are less stringent than others in deciding which
acts are coercive. The varied results appear to be driven by the different
manners in which creditors attempt to obtain repayment. Although there
are many different types, creditors may be divided into four main classes:
credit unions; trade creditors; institutional lenders; and educational lenders.
Courts generally find that trade creditors and educational lenders act
coercively in their attempts to collect prepetition debts while often
determining that credit unions do not use coercion. 5  Courts view
institutional lenders' efforts less consistently. These disparities stem from
the fact that the different creditor organizations act with varying degrees of
formality.
66
A. Credit Unions
Many credit unions maintain formal policies that deny future services to
any member who causes the credit union to incur a financial loss.
67
Courts generally hold that a creditor may inform a debtor of such a policy
without violating section 362(a)(6). In Brown v. Pennsylvania State
Employees Credit Union (In re Brown),6" perhaps the most significant
decision on the scope of section 362(a)(6), the Third Circuit held that a
credit union's letter to the debtor, which informed the debtor of its rule not
to provide future services unless the debtor reaffirmed a prepetition debt,
did not violate the stay.69 The debtor in the case filed a Chapter 7
62. JACKSON, supra note 9, at 163.
63. See part III.A-D.
64. Morgan Guar. Trust Co. v. American Say. and Loan Ass'n, 804 F.2d 1487 (9th Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 482 U.S. 929 (1987).
65. See infra part III.A-B, D.
66. See infra part III.C.
67. See infra notes 69-72, 86-87 and accompanying text.
68. 851 F.2d 81 (3d Cir. 1988).
69. Id. at 85. See also In re Henry, 129 B.R. 75 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1991). In Henry, the
Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Virginia held that a credit union's policy of terminating
membership privileges to any member who caused it a loss did not violate the automatic stay. Id. at
78. The debtor filed a Chapter 13 petition, the liability schedules of which included debts owed to the
credit union. Id. at 76. The credit union subsequently revoked the debtor's membership. Id. The
credit union denied membership privileges in accordance with the its formal policy, which provided:
1994]
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voluntary petition for bankruptcy.7° One month later, the creditor sent the
debtor a letter stating that its policy toward members who have some or all
of their debt discharged in bankruptcy was to deny them future services.71
The letter further provided that the debtor would remain qualified to receive
future services if she reaffirmed the obligation with the requisite court
approval.'
Analyzing whether this action constituted a coercive attempt to collect
the prepetition debt, the court observed that the language in the letter was
I. DENIAL OF ALL CREDIT UNION SERVICES TO MEMBERS WHO HAVE CAUSED
THE CREDIT UNION TO SUFFER A LOSS
(1) The board of directors has authorized that any member who has caused the credit union
to suffer a loss by reason of discharge in bankruptcy or as a result of a default or [sic] a loan,
or by any other means will be denied any further use of credit union services or products.
Id.
In determining whether the credit union's policy violated the stay, the court first noted that the
debtors encountered no difficulty in obtaining similar banking services at a regular bank, although,
perhaps, an increased cost. Id. at 77. The court also found that the credit union did not pressure the
debtors to reaffirm the debt to ensure that their membership privileges remained intact. Id. Finally,
the court observed that the credit union's policy applied in a nondiscriminatory manner to all members
who caused it a financial loss. Id. at 78. The court concluded that the credit union's policy did not
violate section 362(a). Id.
But see In re Guinn, 102 B.R. 838 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1989). In Guinn, the Bankruptcy Court for
the Northern District of Alabama determined that a credit union had violated § 362 by terminating a
debtor's membership, refusing to accept his mortgage payments, and subsequently declaring the
mortgage in default. Id. at 842. The credit union's membership agreement contained a provision
stating that any member who caused the credit union to suffer a loss forfeited membership. Id. at 840.
The credit union reasoned that upon the termination of membership, it was not required to continue to
provide privileges to the debtor, including maintaining the mortgage. Id. at 841. Conscquently, it
determined that it could decline to accept the debtor's mortgage payment, and thus declare the mortgage
in default. Id.
The court addressed the creditor's justification as follows:
The mere cancellation of the debtor's membership privileges-such as maintaining an
interest-bearing share account for the debtor or maintaining a checking account for the
debtor-is not a withdrawal of privileges unique [to] union membership and therefore not so
valuable as to... be found coercive.... The asserted use of the membership-termination
provision so as to prevent the debtor from being able to maintain payments on the real estate
mortgage is also not coercive ....
Id. at 842.
Although terminating the debtor's membership was not a coercive act, refusing mortgage payments
and foreclosing on the mortgage was coercive, thus violating section 362(a)(6) of the Code. Id.
70. Brown, 851 F.2d at 82. After filing, Brown's attorney wrote a letter to the creditor disclosing
the bankruptcy. This letter also commanded the creditor to terminate immediately all efforts at
collection. Id.
71. Id. at 82. The creditor's bylaws mandated barring debtors who caused it financial loss. Id.
at 83.
72. Id. at 82.
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mild.73 Moreover, the court noted that the letter referred to reaffirmation,
a formal agreement overseen by the bankruptcy court.74 The court found
that the creditor did not intend to harass the debtor." Holding that the
creditor did not violate section 362 by simply informing the debtor of its
policy, the court noted that the Code declines to mandate that a creditor do
business with its debtor.7 6 The court declared that to hold otherwise
intolerably broadens the scope of the Code's antidiscrimination provi-
sions,77 which prohibit governmental units and private employers from
discriminating against any person "with respect to employment. 78
Further defending its decision, the court asserted that such a conclusion
did not upset the bankruptcy laws.79 The court deemed the letter was not
unfair because it afforded the debtor the option of choosing between
retaining the creditor's services and discharging the obligation. 81 More-
over, the court expressed concern that prohibiting such communication
could work to the debtor's detriment when the debtor has no knowledge of
its creditor's policy."1
The Brown court also declared that its decision was consistent with both
the Code's "fresh start" and "breathing spell" policies.82 The court
explained that the debtor retained the protective right to a "fresh start" by
virtue of court supervised reaffirmation procedures.8  Referring to
preserving the breathing spell protection, the court remarked that the stay
73. Id. at 84.
74. Id.
75. Brown, 851 F.2d at 85.
76. Id.
77. Id. Explaining the potential adverse effects such an extension would occasion, the court stated:
Congress rejected a general anti-discrimination policy.... Yet, any refusal of future services
by a present creditor has some coercive impact. If we hold that the impact itself is sufficient
to violate the bankruptcy injunctions of § 362 and § 524, then a creditor-whether or not a
governmental unit or employer-may be prevented from denying future services because of
a prior discharged debt. The debtor could do indirectly through § 362 and § 524 what she
cannot accomplish directly through the anti-discrimination provision. We cannot find that
Congress intended this result.
Id.
78. 11 U.S.C. § 525 (1988).
79. Brown, 851 F.2d at 86.
80. Id. The court noted that one objective of the reaffirmation principle is to preserve a debtor's
credit rating. Id.
81. Id. The court asserted that such a prohibition "might prevent the debtor from making the
choice [between reaffirmation which saves one's credit rating, and ruining one's credit rating] until it
is too late." Id.
82. Id. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
83. Brown, 851 F.2d at 86. In addition, the court stressed that the "fresh start" policy does not
impart rights to the debtor above those which Congress saw fit to grant. Id.
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does not prohibit communications by a creditor but rather forbids the
creditor from initiating impending acts, such as a suit or foreclosure.84
Therefore, the court held that the creditor did not violate section 362(a)(6)
by merely informing the debtor of its policy.8"
Similarly, in In re Callender,86 the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern
District of Ohio held that when a credit union notifies a debtor of its
membership denial policy and suggests that the debtor repay the debt, the
credit union does not violate the stay.87 The attorney for the credit union
wrote a letter to the debtor's attorney stating that because the debtor had
caused the credit union to suffer a loss, he was no longer eligible to receive
future services.88 The court determined that the creditor's letter did no
more than state its position and provide the debtor with a method of
avoiding the cessation of service.89 The court relied on Brown to decide
whether the communication amounted to an "act to collect" the debt."0
The court found that the letter closely resembled the "mildly worded" and
noncoercive letter in Brown. Accordingly, the court held that the creditor
had not violated the statutory stay.91
B. Trade Creditors
In contrast, courts typically find that entities which extend goods or
services on credit act coercively when they refuse to deal with the debtor
unless the debtor repays the prepetition obligation. In Olson v. McFarland
Clinic, PC. (In re Olson),92 the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. 99 B.R. 378 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1989).
87. Id. at 380.
88. Id. at 379. The creditor's counsel wrote a letter to the debtor, which stated in part:
I am an attorney writing you on behalf of your credit union. As you will recall, your
bankruptcy plan listed your credit union as unsecured. This means that the credit union will
suffer a loss.
Please understand that your credit union has a policy stating that all services shall be
terminated for any person who causes the credit union a loss.
As a.possible solution, you might want to consider contacting your attorney and having
him place [the credit union] in a special class of unsecured creditors receiving 100% of their
claims. That way, the credit union would consider you for future services just as it would any
other member in good standing.
Id.
89. Id. The debtor had asserted that the creditor's dispatch of the letter constituted an act "to close
debtor's account in retaliation of debtor's petition for relief under Chapter 13." Id.
90. Id. at 380.
91. Id.
92. 38 B.R. 515 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1984).
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District of Iowa determined that a hospital attempted to coerce the debtor
to repay his prepetition debt.93 The hospital sent the debtor a letter
informing him that the hospital would not provide future medical services,
absent repayment. 94  The court noted that on its face the letter exhibited
no express intent to collect the debt.95 Nonetheless, the court expressed
its disdain for harassment disguised as "respect" for the debtor.96 Because
the creditor would provide services if the debtor were to repay the
prepetition obligation, the court held that refusing medical service
functioned only to collect the debt, thus violating section 362(a)(6). 97
The Olson court explained that the Code does not require a
postbankruptcy creditor to provide future services to the debtor.9 The
court remarked that had the defendant merely refused to provide services
to the debtor without mentioning the debtor's bankruptcy filing, section
362(a) would not apply.9 The court found, however, that through this
communication, the creditor conveyed its wish to collect the debt.t"
Applying the language of section 362(a)(6), which forbids attempts to
collect prepetition debts "in any way," the court concluded that the
creditor's actions violated the automatic stay.101
Similarly, in Sportfame of Ohio, Inc. v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co. (In
93. Id. at 518.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 517. The letter from the creditor's administrator provided:
I wish to inform you that the ... [hospital] ... will no longer be able to provide medical
care to you and members of your family.
This action has become necessary based on your failure to pay for the medical services
provided by [the hospital] .... Since you have filed bankruptcy, I realize that we cannot
legally pursue the collection of this account. However, we are willing to reinstate service if
you wish to pay your account voluntarily.
Id. at 516.
96. Id. at 517 (citing In re Hix, 13 B.R. 752, 754 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1981)).
97. Id. at 517-18. The court determined that the hospital utilized the refusal of future services as
leverage in an attempt to collect the debt. Id. at 517.
98. Olson, 38 B.R. at 518.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. Additionally, the court relied upon decisions from comparable prior cases in arriving at
its conclusion. Id. at 517 (citing In re Stephens, 2 B.R. 365, 366 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1980) ("[T]he
creditor ... by requesting a reaffirmation of the pre-bankruptcy debt as a condition precedent for the
granting of a [new] loan has violated section 362(a)(6) .... ."); In re Green, 15 B.R. 75, 78 (Bankr.
S.D. Ohio 198 1) ("Refusing to execute a reaffirmation agreement unless the dischargeable debt [is] paid
violates the statutory rights of the debtor.'); In re Haffner, 25 B.R. 882, 886 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1982)
("[G]overment regulations that condition receipt by a debtor in bankruptcy of a service upon payment
of a prepetition debt violate section 362(a)(6).").
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re Sporfame of Ohio, Inc.), °2 the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern
District of Ohio found that a trade creditor violated the stay when it refused
to provide future goods to the debtor. 3 Prior to filing the bankruptcy
petition, the debtor became in arrears with the creditor.' Subsequently,
the creditor ceased delivering its product to the debtor.' 5 The debtor
contacted the creditor after filing in an attempt to have shipments
resumed,' 6 and although he offered to pay cash for the goods, the
creditor refused unless the debtor paid the arrearage.1 t 7
Analyzing a possible stay encroachment, the court first noted the broad
scope of section 362 and determined that the section should apply to most
actions against debtors.'0 8 Next, the court reiterated Congress' intent that
section 362 prevent creditors from avoiding the protectionist purpose of the
bankruptcy laws.'0 9 Observing that refusing to provide future services to
the debtor, without any explanation, does not violate the Code, the court
declared that this creditor's conditional refusal went too far."' Therefore,
the court found the creditor inherently coerced the debtor, thus violating
section 362(a)(6)."
102. 40 B.R 47 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1984).
103. Id. at 50-51. The court stated that the creditor could have simply refused to sell goods to the
debtor for any reason, or could have given no explanation at all for refusing to deal with the debtor.
Id. at 50.
104. Id. at 48.
105. Id. at 48-49.
106. Id. at 49.
107. 40 B.R. at 49. The debtor asserted that because the creditor refused to ship these goods, the
debtor could not continue to supply its customers with a certain brand of sporting goods. Many of the
debtor's customers asked for this brand by name and refused other lines of goods as replacements.
Accordingly the debtor claimed that Sportfame would experience customer dissatisfaction and a loss
of profits. Id.
108. Id. at 50 (citing 2 COLLIER, supra note 31, 1 362.04, at 362-27).
109. Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 27, at 50-51, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
5826-37; S. REP. No. 989, supra note 27, at 342, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6298).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 50-5 1. See also Karsh Travel, Inc. v. Airlines Reporting Corp. (In re Karsh Travel, Inc.),
87 B.R. 110 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1988). In Karsh, the court found that an airline ticket clearinghouse
violated the automatic stay when it refused to send more tickets to the debtor travel agency unless the
agency repaid a prepetition debt. Id. at 111-12. At the time of the Chapter 11 filing, the debtor had
a substantial amount of tickets in stock that it continued to issue in a normal fashion. Id. at 11. The
creditor refused to send more tickets to the debtor due to a bad prepetition check. Id. The creditor
requested that the debtor return certain hardware and documents "pending payment of the prepetition
debt." Id. Stating that "[i]t is a clear violation of the automatic stay to refuse to do business with a
debtor unless prepetition debt is paid," the court found that the creditor's actions in this ease violated
section 362(a)(6). Id. at 112.
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C. Institutional Lenders
Unlike the cases involving credit unions and trade creditors, courts are
more divided in their decisions concerning possible automatic stay
violations by institutional lenders. In In re Stephens,"' the Bankruptcy
Court for the Northern District of Ohio found that a creditor violated
section 362(a)(6) by requiring a debtor to reaffirm his prepetition obligation
before granting him a new loan. In Stephens, the creditor did not solicit
repayment until the debtor sought a new loan.113 Nevertheless, the court
noted that in drafting section 362(a)(6), Congress undertook to preclude a
creditor from harassing a debtor in order to collect a prepetition debt."4
The court further observed that Congress intended to protect a debtor's
right to both a discharge and a fresh start." 5 Finding the scope of section
362(a)(6) extensive, the court concluded that the reaffirmation agreement
was unenforceable because the creditor's request violated the automatic
stay.
16
However, in Schmidt v. American Fletcher National Bank and Trust Co.
(In re Schmidt),"7 the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of
Indiana held that the creditor could refuse to reaffirm a secured debt unless
the debtors agreed to reaffirm an unsecured debt without violating the
automatic stay."' The Schmidt court emphasized that the debtor had
contacted the creditor first." 9  Accordingly, the court interpreted the
creditor's efforts to collect as passive, and not violative of section
362(a)(6). 2 ' The court surmised that its ruling was consistent with the
112. 2 B.R1 365, 366 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1980).
113. Id. at 366.
114. Id. ("The conduct prohibited ranges from that of an informal nature, such as by telephone
contact or by dunning letters to more formal judicial and administrative proceedings that are also stayed
under paragraph (1).") (citing 2 COLLIER, supra note 31, 362.04, at 362-65).
115. The court remarked that creditors must file reaffirmation applications with the court for
approval. Id. at 366-67 (citing 9 Bankr. Serv., L. Ed., supra note 3, § 82:4, at 139-41). The Stephens
court noted that Congress requires courts to review reaffirmation so that creditors may not coerce
debtors into reaffirming their debts. Id.
116. Id. at 367.
117. 64 B.R. 226 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1986).
118. Id. at 228.
119. Id. The court stated:
Here, [the creditor] did not contact the Schmidts, but only discussed its policies on
reaffirmation after contacted by the Schmidts and their attorney. [The creditor] did not
repossess its collateral until after the Schmidts indicated that they would abandon it.
Id.
120. Id.
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stay's basic purpose: benefitting the debtor by preventing creditor
harassment."' The court found that the creditor had not harassed the
debtor, but had merely communicated its policy on reaffirmation."' Such
a statement, the court held, is not coercive, and therefore does not infringe
upon the automatic stay.'3
D. Educational Lenders
The courts that have examined cases concerning educational loan debts
consistently hold that an educational lender violates the automatic stay by
refusing to release the debtor's transcript unless the loan obligation is
repaid. In California State University, Fresno v. Gustafson (In re
Gustafson),24 the court concluded that withholding a student-debtor's
transcript was an act to collect an educational loan debt in violation of
section 362(a)(6)."z In this case, after filing for bankruptcy relief, the
debtor requested his transcripts for employment purposes.'26  The
university replied that it would release the transcript only if the debtor
agreed to reaffirm his student loan. 27
The Gustafson court distinguished these facts from the Brown creditor's
mere communication of policy, stating that the university actually withheld
the debtor's transcript, rather than merely communicating that it would do
SO.128 The court deemed it immaterial that the university made no
121. Id. (citing In re Matthews v. Rosene, 739 F.2d 249 (7th Cir. 1984)).
122. Schmidt, 64 B.R. at 229.
123. Id. (citing In re Brown, 49 B.R. 558 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1985)).
124. 111 B.R. 282 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1990), rev'd on other grounds, 934 F.2d 216 (9th Cir. 1991).
125. Id. at 286-87. In reaching its decision, the court partially relied on two other decisions, In re
Parham, 56 B.R. 531 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1986), and In re Heath, 3 B.R. 351 (Bankr. N.D. I11. 1980).
Unlike Gustafson's Chapter 7 filing, Parham and Heath involved Chapter 13 debtors, however, the
court determined that the distinction was not relevant. Id.
In Heath, the court held that a university's refusal to issue a transcript to a debtor violated the
automatic stay. 3 B.R. at 355. The university denied the debtor his transcript until he repaid the debt.
Id. at 351. The court considered Congress' intent that section 362(a)(6) prohibit creditors from
attempting to collect a prepetition debt "in any way." Id. at 354-55. Next, the court determined that
the university acted solely to collect the debtor's obligation. Id. at 355. Consequently, the court found
that the university acted within section 362(a)(6)'s scope, and thus violated the stay. Id.
126. Gustafson, 111 B.R. at 284. The debtor stated that he needed a transcript in order to take a
civil service exam. Id.
127. Id. The letter stated that: "the only way [we] would release your transcripts before ...
receiv[ing] the 'Discharge from the Bankruptcy Court' would be for you to reaffirm your [student loan
obligation] with [the university]."
Id.
128. Id. at 287 n.5.
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affirmative attempt to collect the debt,2 9 noting that in some instances,
refusing to take affirmative action amounts to an act to collect. 30 The
court found that withholding the transcript could not serve any purpose
other than to coerce Gustafson into reaffirming his prepetition student loan
obligation.' 3' Consequently, the court held that this act breached the
automatic stay provision. 2
Similarly, in Virginia Union University v. Parham (In re Parham),'33
the Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Virginia held that a
university could not retain a debtor's transcript, releasing it only when she
repaid an overdue student loan.' The school had a blanket policy of
withholding transcripts from students who were not current on their loan
accounts. 3 5 Thus, when the debtor requested her transcript, the universi-
ty refused to issue it until she repaid her loan.'36 In deciding whether the
university had violated section 362(a)(6), the Parham court looked to other
courts for direction,' acknowledging the importance of a transcript to the
debtor in search of gainful employment. 3  Additionally, the court
remarked that section 362(a)(6) prohibits all creditors from attempting to
collect any prepetition debt.'39 Hence, the court concluded that the
129. Id. at 287 ("The fact that [the creditor] did not act affirmatively does not alter our conclusion
that withholding the transcript is an attempt to collect a debt in violation of section 362(a)(6) ...
(citing In re Farmers Markets, Inc., 792 F.2d 1400, 1404 (9th Cir. 1986)).
130. Id. The paramount consideration, the court stated, was whether, in the totality of the
circumstances, the exchange manifested an attempt to collect a prepetition debt. Id. at 288.
131. Gustafson, II1 B.R. at 286-87.
132. Id. at 288.
133. 56 B.1. 531 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1986).
134. Id. at 534. See also Andrews Univ. v. Merchant (In re Merchant), 958 F.2d 738, 741 (6th Cir.
1992) (holding that a prepetition creditor violated section 362(a)(6) when it withheld a student debtor's
transcript); Board of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. Howren (In re Howren), 10 B.R. 303, 305-06 (Bankr.
D. Kan. 1980) (retaining transcript solely to compel repayment of student loan violated automatic stay).
135. Parham, 56 B.R. at 532.
136. Id. at 531-32.
137. Id. at 532. The court relied upon the decisions in In re Heath, 3 B.R. 351 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1980), and In re Ware, 9 B.R. 24 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1981). See supra note 125 for a discussion of
Heath. In Ware, the student-debtor requested a copy of her transcript from the college to which she
was indebted so that she could attend another college. Ware, 9 B.R. at 25. The creditor refused to
release her transcript. Id. The court determined that the college refused to turn over her transcript for
the sole purpose of collecting the debt. Id. Because section 362 prohibits "any act to collect" a
prepetition obligation owed to the creditor, the court concluded that the college's conduct violated the
automatic stay. Id.
138. Parham, 56 B.R. at 534 (citing In re Reese, 38 B.R. 681 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1984)).
139. Id. The court stated: "The case law is clear that a petition under Chapter 13 prohibits a
creditor from attempting to collect any debt by any act, provided that such debt would be dischargeable
under Chapter 13." Id. However, the court noted that because "Congress made certain student loans
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university had violated the automatic stay.4
IV. CRITIQUE OF THE JUDICIAL ANALYSIS
Courts that have addressed the question whether a prebankruptcy
creditor's postbankruptcy refusal to deal with the debtor violates the
automatic stay have analyzed the question incorrectly. By focusing on
whether a creditor's act was coercive or noncoercive, courts have
unnecessarily broadened the scope of section 362(a)(6) beyond that which
Congress intended. Because refusing future services always involves some
degree of coercion, the existing standard suggests that all such actions
toward the debtor might violate the stay.'4' To decide exactly what, if
any, degree of coercion amounts to an act to collect in violation of section
362(a)(6) necessarily invites inconsistency and confusion.'42
Moreover, with the exception of an educational lender's withholding of
a transcript, discussed in greater detail below, there exists no material
reason why a creditor's classification should make a difference in stay
violation determinations. Educational lenders that decline to release the
debtor's transcript absent repayment of a student loan present a unique
situation because the debtor cannot obtain from any other institution the
record of past academic performance which is so often instrumental in
making a fresh start.'43 The current disparity in the judgments between
trade creditors and credit unions epitomizes the irrationality of categorizing
all other types of creditors in connection with section 362(a)(6) viola-
tions.'" For example, the court in Olson determined that a hospital's
letter to the debtor informing him that it would no longer provide services
unless he repaid the debt violated section 362(a)(6).'45 However, the
Brown court found that a credit union's letter to the debtor, which informed
him that for policy reasons it would not provide future services save
nondischargeable in Chapter 7, it would not be a violation of the automatic stay to withhold a student's
transcript in order to collect a debt which the student still has an obligation to repay." Id. at 533 (citing
Johnson v. Edinboro State College, 728 F.2d 163, 166 (3d Cir. 1984)).
140. Id. at 534. The court held that the university must release a copy of a debtor-student's
transcript when the student-debtor pays the processing fee. Id.
141. See supra note 77.
142. JACKSON, supra note 9, at 163.
143. See infra notes 182-90 and accompanying text.
144. See supra part ILI.A-B.
145. Olson v. McFarland Clinic, P.C. (In re Olson), 38 B.R. 515, 518 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1984).
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reaffirmation of the debt, complied with the stay.146  Both courts held that
the Code does not compel a postbankruptcy creditor to provide services to
the debtor. 47  Additionally, neither of the letters revealed a direct attempt
to collect the obligations. 41 Yet the court in Olson determined that the
hospital could have avoided violating the stay by not mentioning the
debtor's bankruptcy in its letter."4' Though the creditors' actions in these
cases were substantially similar, the courts reached different results t50
Because of this inconsistency, creditors cannot accurately predict how a
court will respond to a "conditional refusal to deal": a situation in which
a creditor refuses to deal with a debtor in the future unless the prepetition
debt is repaid.' 5 Consequently, creditors expose themselves to signifi-
cant risk when communicating such a position to the debtor. 52 The only
notable consideration courts have given to determinations of stay infringe-
ment is whether a creditor has a policy covering its actions.'53 If a
creditor's policy is to decline further dealings with any debtor who causes
it a loss, courts find the conditional refusal noncoercive' 54 Yet this
formality seems immaterial in principle, especially because any creditor can
assert at trial that it possesses such a policy.' 55 More importantly, the
current test places creditors with less expertise at a disadvantage to
sophisticated creditors, whose influence Congress sought to limit.U
6
Therefore, the courts' decisions regarding conditional refusals to deal are
146. Brown v. Pennsylvania State Employees Credit Union (In re Brown), 851 F.2d 81, 85 (3d Cir.
1988).
147. Id. at 85 (stating that no provision in the Code expressly "requires this creditor to do business
with this debtor"); Olson, 38 B.R. at 518 (affirming the notion that "the Bankruptcy Code may not be
construed to compel the defendant to provide services to... [d]ebtors").
148. See supra notes 68-72, 95 and accompanying text.
149. Olson, 38 B.R. at 518. The court declared that if the creditor had "simply refuse[d] service
without any mention of the Debtors' bankruptcy filing, § 362 would not come into play." Id.
ISO. See supra notes 73-85, 94-101 and accompanying text.
151. See Keating, supra note 9, at 81-82.
152. In Olson, for example, the court found that sending debtors a letter that advised them that it
would no longer provide medical services unless the debtors repaid debts for medical expenses already
incurred, warranted sanctions. Olson, 38 B.R. at 518-19.
153. See supra notes 66-69, 76, 87 and accompanying text.
154. See supra notes 67-91 and accompanying text.
155. See, e.g., In re Callender, 99 B.R. 378, 379 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1989). The president of the
credit union testified at trial that it was the policy of the credit union to deny service to any member
who caused it a financial loss. Id. at 379. Although the policy of which the president spoke was
contained in the credit union's bylaws, the court attached no special significance to this fact. Id.
156. Congress intended to prevent sophisticated creditors from taking advantage of debtors. H.R.
R P. No. 595, supra note 27, at 342, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6298; S. REP. No. 989, supra
note 27, at 51, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5837.
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inconsistent, economically inefficient, and unfair.157
V. PROPOSAL FOR A MORE APPROPRIATE STANDARD BY WHICH TO
DETERMINE AUTOMATIC STAY VIOLATIONS
Courts should use a different framework to analyze conditional refusals
to deal. The present analysis, which seeks to differentiate coercive from
noncoercive behavior, is inadequate because judgments turn on inessential
details, semantic differences, and formalities.' 8 Instead, when determin-
ing which creditor actions violate the automatic stay, courts should prohibit
only "affirmative acts to collect": those instances in which a creditor
makes an unconditional request or demand to a debtor for repayment of the
prepetition debt. Except in the case of educational lenders, prebankruptcy
creditors' postbankruptcy conditional refusals to deal with a debtor should
fall outside of the scope of section 362(a)(6). Such a distinction will
sufficiently balance the interests of debtors and creditors.
A. Section 366 Distinction
Section 366(a) of the Bankruptcy Code supports the proposition that
conditional refusals to deal do not violate the automatic stay. This section
prohibits public utilities from conditioning future services on repayment of
debt. '59 The utility may, however, require the debtor to assure future
performance, and the creditor may refuse service if the debtor does not pay
a deposit or offer security within twenty days.' 60  Section 366 differs
drastically from pre-Code caselaw, which permitted utilities to decline to
provide prospective services until the debtor repaid a discharged debt.16,
In implementing section 366, therefore, Congress balanced the right of a
creditor to refuse to deal with a debtor against the debtor's need for utility
services.162
157. See supra notes 144, 150, 152, 156 and accompanying text.
158. See supra part III.
159. 11 U.S.C. § 366(a) (1988). Section 366(a) provides:
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a utility may not alter, refuse, or
discontinue service to, or discriminate against, the trustee or the debtor solely on the basis of
the commencement of a case under this title or that a debt owed by the debtor to such utility
for service rendered before the order for relief was not paid when due.
11 U.S.C. § 366(a) (1988). See also I EPsmIN ET AL., supra note 4, § 3-9, at 123.
160. 11 U.S.C. § 366(b) (1988).
161. See Keating, supra note 9, at 98 n.130 (citing Ryan v. Ohio Edison Co., 611 F.2d 1170 (6th
Cir.); Slenderella Sys., Inc. v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 286 F.2d 488 (2d Cir.)).
162. Hanratty v. Philadelphia Elec. Co. (In re Hanratty), 907 F.2d 1418, 1424 (3d Cir. 1990). The
court stated that the purpose of section 366 is "'to prevent the threat of termination from being used
[VOL. 72:507
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol72/iss1/11
19941 POSTBANKRUPTCY REFUSALS TO DEAL
The clear mandate of section 366(a) stands in stark contrast to the
automatic stay provision:'63 Section 362(a)(6) does not expressly forbid
general creditors or equity holders from refusing to deal prospectively with
the prepetition debtor. 6  Had Congress intended to prohibit a general
creditor from refusing to deal with the debtor save repayment of a debt, it
could have done so as it did in the case of public utility creditors.
Accordingly, this analysis suggests that Congress' intent to prohibit a
creditor from engaging in "any act" to collect a prepetition debt was not to
forbid every conceivably coercive act. The legislative history of section
362(a)(6) reveals that Congress was concerned that the naive debtor would
succumb to a sophisticated creditor's affirmative, rather than conditional,
attempt at collecting a prepetition debt. 6 '
The facts of In re Gibsont66 are thus more reflective of the activities
that Congress sought to prevent. 67 In Gibson, the creditor knew that the
debtors had filed a bankruptcy petition.'68 Nevertheless, the creditor
made multiple attempts to collect the debt by calling and visiting the
debtors at home. 69 The Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of
Ohio found that the creditor had harassed the debtor.70 As a result, the
court determined that the creditor's affirmative attempts to collect the
debtors' prepetition debt violated section 362(a)(6). t7 t  The Gibson
creditor's actions are clearly the "acts ... to collect" prepetition debts that
to collect prepetition debts while not forcing the utility to provide services for which it may never be
paid."' Id. (quoting Begley v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 760 F.2d 46, 49 (3d Cir. 1985)). See also 1
EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 4, § 3-9, at 123 (stating that the utility "enjoys an absolute or near
monopoly").
163. For the text of section 366(a), see supra note 159.
164. 1I U.S.C. § 362(a)(6) (1988).
165. Congress worried that "(i)nexperienced, frightened, or ill-counseled debtors may succumb to
suggestions to repay notwithstanding their bankruptcy." H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 27, at 342,
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6298; S. REP. No. 989, supra note 27, at 50-51, reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5836-37.
166. 16 B.R. 682 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1981).
167. Id. at 683-84. In Gibson, the debtors filed a voluntary petition for Chapter 13 relief. Id. at
683. The creditor held a security interest in a washer, a dryer, and two television sets. Id. The
Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Ohio affirmed the debtors' plan, which provided for a
100% dividend on all claims. Id. The creditor, however, failed to file a proof of claim within the time
limitation imposed by Rule 13-302(e)(2) of the Bankruptcy Rules of Procedure. Id. After confirmation,
the creditor made several affirmative attempts to collect the outstanding debt. Id.
168. Id. at 683. The debtors sent proper notification of their filing to the creditor. Id. Moreover,
the creditor attended a meeting of the creditors regarding the bankruptcy. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 684.
171. 16 B.1R at 684.
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Congress intended to proscribe.
Therefore, courts that have addressed the conditional refusal to deal issue
have broadened the scope of section 362(a)(6) by holding that coercive
attempts to collect a prepetition debt violate the automatic stay. Because
any act to collect is to some extent coercive,17 2 the courts' classification
may prevent a creditor from refusing to deal with the debtor because of a
prepetition debt." This prospect is inconsistent with the foundation of
contract law-the right to freedom of contract." Moreover, such a result
enables the debtor to use section 362(a)(6) to obtain advantages normally
only available by means of filing for bankruptcy.17 1 Under this scenario,
the debtor could force the creditor to deal with him even though the
creditor has no legal duty to do so. 6 Hence the courts' coercive impact
analysis also presents the debtor with a potentially dangerous "offensive
use" of the Code's automatic stay provision. 7 1
Accordingly, the logical point at which to draw the line in such stay
violation determinations is between affirmative attempts to collect
prepetition obligations from the debtor and conditional refusals to deal.
Using this simple delineation, it is unnecessary to examine irrelevant
postpetition events, such as which party initiated contact and which creditor
possessed a formal policy not to provide future services. The proposed
distinction would thus significantly reduce, if not eliminate, the disparate
judgments over the refusal to deal issue produced by the existing coercive-
noncoercive framework. For example, under the suggested approach the
actions of the defendant hospital in Olson would not have violated section
362(a)(6). Such interpretive consistency would enable creditors to decide,
with certainty, how to communicate appropriately their positions to the
debtor. 8 Moreover, because the debtor may seek the services elsewhere,
this statutory construction does not impair the debtor's right to a fresh start
and a breathing spell.'79 Because countless creditors exist in the United
172. See supra note 77.
173. See supra note 77.
174. For a discussion of the concept of freedom of contract, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS ch. 8, Introductory Note (1981); E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRAcrs 325, 20-23 (1982).
175. See Keating, supra note 9, at 82 ("This interpretation of [the] stay gives the Debtor a
weapon.").
176. Id.
177. For an excellent discussion of the "offensive use" of the stay, see generally Keating, supra
note 9.
178. The concurrent reduction in risk would, in return, reduce creditors' overall costs. RICHARD
G. LiPSEY ET AL., MICROECONOMICS 167 (1988).
179. See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
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States, a single creditor's denial of future services is generally not essential
for the debtor to make a fresh start. 8 ' Furthermore, a creditor's commu-
nication with the debtor, absent any threat of an impending foreclosure or
suit, does not frustrate the debtor's breathing spell.'
B. Educational Lender Exception
The sole exception to the proposed distinction between affirmative acts
to collect and conditional refusals to deal pertains to those educational
lenders that refuse to release the debtor's transcript unless the debtor repays
the amount owed on a student loan. Educational institutions are unique in
the sense that the debtor cannot, for any amount of money, obtain from any
other source a transcript reflective of his work at a particular school.'
Because proof of education is essential to employment opportunities, the
180. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
181. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
182. See supra note 138 and accompanying text. The author realizes that some individuals might
draw parallels between educational institutions and suppliers of other unique goods or services or
institutions having a virtual monopoly on a service or supply for a particular geographical location.
This similarity appears to suggest that these creditors should also be prohibited from making conditional
refusals to deal under the proposed approach. However, the author believes that educational lenders
that refuse to release a debtor's transcript absent repayment of a prepetition debt remain so distinct from
such other limited creditors as to warrant special treatment. As indicated in the text of this Note,
educational institutions are unique in the sense that the student-debtor may not obtain a record of his
or her academic work from any other source, at any price. There are absolutely no other creditors from
which to obtain a transcript. Conversely, it is not impossible for a merchant-debtor to obtain substitute
goods or services from other creditors in the "parallel" circumstances mentioned above.
Unlike a debtor desiring a transcript, the debtor in need of the services of a rural goods supplier, for
example, that declines to provide its potentially unique goods or services in the future unless the debtor
repays the amount owed on a prior obligation can approach the supplier of a close substitute and even
offer to pay more than the going rate to secure that good or service. In the unlikely event that there
is no close substitute available, the debtor will have no choice but to discontinue his or her business.
Although such an outcome seems severe, the line must be drawn at excepting educational lenders. An
educational institution withholding a transcript rises above the rare supplier of a good or service for
which there is no substitute. A transcript is essential to a fresh start because evidence of it enables the
debtor to obtain a job position commanding a higher salary, in any number of fields, than he or she
otherwise would be able to procure. The debtor could in turn use a portion of this financial gain to
repay creditors. Moreover, permitting the debtor to obtain a transcript from an institution prior to
repayment of a student loan is justified because, unlike most other loans, educational loans are not
dischargeable in Chapters 7 or 13 bankruptcies. See infra note 184 and accompanying text.
Rural banks or hospitals that refuse to extend services to a debtor absent repayment of a prepetition
debt should not be excepted from the permitted conditional refusal to deal for the same reasons as those
given in the above analysis concerning suppliers. In today's world of myriad financial services, many
of which can be accessed by computer or telephone, the rural bank has become just one of a debtor's
many banking options. Moreover, in nonemergency medical situations, a debtor can, albeit at an
inconvenience, seek treatment at a different hospital.
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educational lender's exclusive service of providing a transcript is necessary
to the debtor's fresh start.
183
Additionally, the educational lender does not face the same perils of a
possible offensive use of the automatic stay as other kinds of creditors.
Because student loans are not dischargeable in Chapter 7 or Chapter 13
bankruptcies, the debtor must ultimately repay such loans. 84 While other
debts are also nondischargeable, owing an unforgivable obligation to a
general creditor does not compel that creditor to engage in future
enterprises with the debtor. 5 Similarly, an educational institution is not
required to maintain the debtor's enrollment as a student or to allow the
debtor to enroll again in the future. However, a debtor's transcript often
directly affects the debtor's ability to make a fresh start. 86 To deny the
debtor the transcript results is too great an injustice. Dispensing a
transcript does not rise to the level of entering into a separate and distinct
transaction-the release simply reflects one's past educational achieve-
ments. In light of the foregoing discussion, then, an educational lender
should not be able to refuse to release a debtor's transcript merely because
the debtor has not repaid a loan.
The proposed delineation imposes no undue hardship upon the debtors
of all other kinds of creditors. 7 Consequently, courts should not label
creditors when determining whether the denial of future services to the
prepetition debtor violates section 362(a)(6). A creditor needs to have the
opportunity to inform debtors of its position regarding the availability of
future services once the debtor has filed a petition. 8 Such communica-
tion helps the debtor to make informed bankruptcy decisions. 9 Prohibit-
ing this type of postpetition communication between the debtor and creditor
183. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
184. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (1988).
185. See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
186. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
187. See supra notes 179-81 and accompanying text.
188. Brown v. Pennsylvania State Employees Credit Union (In re Brown), 851 F.2d 81, 86 (3d Cir.
1988). It is unreasonable to permit the creditor to decline to provide future services to the debtor, but
prohibit the creditor from explaining its position. Id.
189. Id. The Brown court stated:
The communication [describing the conditional refusal to deal] works no unfairness on the
debtor. On the contrary, it allows [the debtor] to choose between discharging the debt and
retaining the creditor's services. Where, as here, a debtor is unaware of the creditor's policy,
barring communication might prevent the debtor from making the choice until it is too late.
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POSTBANKRUPTCY REFUSALS TO DEAL
goes beyond the intended scope of the Code's automatic stay provision. 9 '
Therefore, while an affirmative attempt to collect a prepetition debt is
clearly contrary to section 362(a)(6), the bankruptcy courts should not
consider a creditor's refusal to deal, conditioned upon repayment of a
prepetition debt, a violation of the automatic stay.
VI. CONCLUSION
For the past 150 years, Congress has continuously aimed to increase
debtor protection in bankruptcy. However, courts have overextended this
notion by broadening the scope of the Bankruptcy Code's automatic stay
provision. Currently, a prebankruptcy creditor's postbankruptcy refusal to
deal with a debtor unless the debtor repays the prepetition debt may violate
the stay. Because prior courts' decisions on the conditional refusal to deal
issue are disparate, often depending upon the classification of the creditor,
future courts should abandon the current coercive impact analysis. These
courts need a more workable delineation, such as the one proposed in this
Note, in order to determine effectively what creditor conduct amounts to
an "act to collect" a prepetition debt in violation of section 362(a)(6).
Donald Wayne
190. Id. The stay provides the debtor with a respite from immediate action by creditors, not from
communication with employers.
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